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Abstract
In this paper we construct a subclass of the composite access structure introduced in [9] based on schemes realizing the
structure given by the set of codewords of minimal support of linear codes. This class enlarges the iterated threshold
class studied in the same paper. Furthermore all the schemes on this paper are ideal (in fact they allow a vector space
construction) and we arrived to give a partial answer to a conjecture stated in [9]. Finally, as a corollary we proof
that all the monotone access structures based on all the minimal supports of a code can be realized by a vector space
construction.
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1. Introduction
We will use the following notation. Let P = {Pi}ni=1 be a set of participants, K be the set of all possible keys and S
be the share sets. Secret sharing schemes are used to distribute a secret K ∈ K , like a private key of a cryptosystem,
among a group of individuals P, giving to each participant a share from S, such that only specified subsets of P are
able to determine the secret K from joining the shares they hold. Let Γ ⊆ 2P be the family of subsets of P which
are able to reconstructed the secret (i.e. authorized or qualified subsets) then Γ is called the access structure of the
scheme. Since Γ is presupposed to satisfy the monotone property (that is, if A ⊆ B ⊆ P and A ∈ Γ, then B ∈ Γ) then
the set of minimal authorized subset of Γ, denoted by Γm, determines a basis of Γ. The dual of the access structure Γ
on the set P is defined as the access structure form by the subsets whose complements are not authorized, i.e.
Γ∗ = {A ⊆ P | P \ A < Γ} .
A perfect sharing scheme avoid unauthorized coalitions to learn any information about the secret. Ito, Saito and
Nishizeki [7] showed that for any arbitrary monotone collection of authorized set Γ, there exists a perfect sharing
scheme that realizes Γ. Moreover, a secret sharing scheme is ideal if it is perfect and the domain of shares of each user
is S. An access structure Γ is called ideal if there is an ideal scheme realizing it. An interesting class of access structure
are those admitting a vector space construction, this structure is due to Brickell [3]. Let Fq be a finite field with q
elements, an access structure Γ on P has a vector space construction over Fq if there exists a map Φ : P −→ Fdq
and a vector v ∈ Fdq \ {0} such that the vector v can be expressed as a linear combination of vectors in the set
{Φ(Pi) | Pi ∈ A} if and only if A ∈ Γ. Schemes realizing this structures are called vector space secret sharing schemes.
In sake of simplicity and without lost of generality usually v is taken to be the vector e1 = (1, 0). Unfortunately
finding a rule for deciding when an access structure Γ admits a vector space construction is still an open problem if
the underlying field is not fixed. The first examples of secret sharing schemes that appeared on the literature were
examples of threshold schemes. The access structure of an (t, n)-threshold scheme is formed by subsets of participants
whose cardinality is at least t. These schemes were introduced independently by Shamir [13] and Blakley [2] in 1979.
Shamir’s scheme used polynomial interpolation while Blakley’s method is based on intersection properties of finite
geometries, indeed both ideas where behind or related to the use of Reed-Solomon codes. Threshold schemes are
ideal, admit a vector space construction and give the same opportunity to all the participants to access the secret.
Indeed taking n different non-zero elements α1, . . . , αn ∈ Fq and Φ defined by Φ(Pi) = (1, αi, α2i , . . . , αd−1i ) ∈ Fdq for
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all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} then the (t, n)-threshold scheme can be seen as a vector space secret sharing schemes. From now on,
the expression (t, n) will denote a (t, n)-threshold scheme. In real life, not all participants are in the same hierarchy and
they do not have the same privileges to access certain secrets. This idea has been adapted to secret sharing Schemes
by various authors. For instance, multilevel schemes by Simmons [14], bipartite structures by Padro´ and Sa´ez [11]
or compartmented schemes by Brickell [3]. In this article we will used a special construction of this type of schemes
presented in [9] called composition of access structures. Let P = P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ps be a partition of P into disjoints sets
where P j is given by the set {P( j)1 , . . . , P
( j)
n j } and n = n1 + . . . + nr. Let Γ0 be an access structure on P and Γi be an
access structure on Pi for i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, then the composite access structure of Γ1, . . . , Γr following Γ0, denoted by
Γ0[Γ1, . . . , Γr] is defined as follows:
Γ0[Γ1, Γ2, . . . , Γr] =
⋃
B∈Γ0
{A ⊆ P | A ∩ Pi ∈ Γi for all Pi ∈ B} . (1)
Let us briefly fix the notation and introduce some basic definitions from coding theory. A linear code C of length n
and dimension k over Fq, or an [n, k] code for short, is a k-dimensional subspace of Fnq. For every codeword c ∈ C
its suport is define as its support as a vector in Fq, i.e. supp(c) = {i | ci , 0}. A codeword c is a minimal support
codeword of C if it is non-zero and supp(c) is not contained in the support of any other codeword. We will denote by
Cm the set of codewords of minimal support of C. Note that describing the set of codewords with minimum hamming
weight in an arbitrary linear code is an NP-problem [1] even if preprocessing is allowed [5]. Some improvements on
their computation have been recently made in [8]. There are several ways to obtain a secret sharing using a linear
code C, we refer the reader to [6, 10, 12]. It is not difficult to show that a vector space construction is equivalent to a
code in the following sense: consider the matrix whose first column is the vector assigned to the dealer and the rest of
columns are the vector assigned to the participants, this matrix can be seen as a parity check matrix of a code C and
the authorized subsets are those codeword supports containing a non-zero element on the first position.
In this paper we give a slightly different definition to the previous one. We define the access structure related to the
[n, k] code C over P with |P| = n, and we denote it by ΓC, as the set ΓC =
{
A ⊆ P | ∃c ∈ C \ {0} : A = ⋃i∈supp(c) Pi}.
With this definition we study the composite access structures of the form Γ0[ΓC1 , ΓC2 , . . . , ΓCr ]. We enlarge the well
known class of iterated threshold structures in [9]. The main result is that this structure admits a vector space con-
struction when Γ0 admits a vector space construction. This class of structures gives a partial answer to the conjecture
in [9, Open Problem 2] and they are more “natural” that the one proposed in it since the dealer appears only in one of
the components and therefore there is no need of projecting the shares. As a corollary we obtain that ΓC also admits a
vector space construction.
2. Composition of structures related to linear codes
Let {Ci}ri=1 be a set of linear Fq codes each one of length ni and dimension ki for i = 1, . . . , r. For each code Ci we
define the access structure related to Ci over the set of participants Pi = {Pi1, P
i
2, . . . , P
i
ni
} as the set
ΓCi = Γi +
{
{Pij1 , . . . P
i
js} | ∃c , 0, c ∈ Ci such that supp(c) = { j1, . . . , js}
}
. (2)
That is, the family of qualified subsets is in one to one correspondence with the supports associated to the codewords
of Ci and indeed Γmi is determined by the minimal support codewords of Ci.
Definition 1. Let Pi = {Pi1, P
i
2, . . . , P
i
ni
} be the set of participants related to the code Ci for i = 1, . . . , r and consider
all of them disjoint. Let Γ0 be an access structure over {Pi}ri=1, we define the access struture Γ0[C1, . . . ,Cs] over the
set of participants P = ⊔si=1 Pi as the composite structure (see Equation 1 for a definition of composite structure)
Γ0[C1, . . . ,Cs] = Γ0[ΓC1 , . . . , ΓCs ]. (3)
Remark 1. Note that the monotone access structures ΓCi are Fq-matroid representable structures but not in the usual
sense (see for example [4]) since they do not have a distinguished participant or a dealer. In our case all the supports
in C are considered, not only those that include the first coordinate. Thus, by definition, it is not obvious that they can
be realized by a vector space construction. We will show in Corollary 1 that this last statement is true.
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Remark 2. If each Ci is taken to be the Reed-Solomon code RS (ni, ki) of parameters [ni, ki] and Γ0 is a threshold
secret sharing scheme then we recover the class of iterated threshold access structures defined in [9].
Proposition 1.
(Γ0[C1, . . . ,Cs])⋆ = Γ⋆0 [C⊥1 , . . . ,C⊥s ]
Proof. We know by [9, Proposition 2] that (Γ0[ΓC1 , . . . , ΓCs ])⋆ = Γ⋆0 [Γ⋆C1 , . . . , Γ⋆Cs ]. But the structure Γ⋆Ci is repre-
sentable by a code (Fq-representable matroid) which is given by its dual code C⊥i and the result follows.
Recall that we will denote by Γm the minimal qualified subsets in the access structure Γ and by Cm the subsets of
participants in ΓC related to minimal codewords of C.
Proposition 2.
(Γ0[C1, . . . ,Cs])m = Γm0 [Cm1 , . . . ,Cms ]
Proof. It follows straightforward from the definitions and [9, Proposition 1].
3. Main Theorem
Lemma 1. Let C be a Fq-linear code of parameters [n, k]. There exists a Fqs -linear code C′ of parameters [n, k]
fulfilling the following properties:
1. ΓC = ΓC′ .
2. For each minimal support S ∈ {1, . . . , n} of C′ there exists a m ∈ (C′)m with ∑ni=1 mi , 0 and supp(m) = S .
Proof. Let Γm
C
= {A1, A2, · · · , Aα} be the set of minimal qualified subsets of ΓC w.r.t. some ordering. Let H be a parity
check matrix of C where h j denotes the j-th column with j = 1, . . . , n.
By definition A1 is related to at least a codeword support of C. Assume that all linear combination based on A1
over Fq satisfy the following expression:∑n
j=1 λ jh j = 0 with
∑n
j=1 λ j = 0 .
Then we proceed as follows:
1. Choose an arbitrary linear combination of the above set, say λ11, . . . , λ1n ∈ Fq, where
λ1j , 0 if P j ∈ A1,
∑n
j=1 λ
1
jh j = 0 and
∑n
j=1 λ
1
j = 0.
2. Take a column h j such that λ1j , 0 and define the vector
h j =
1
γ1
h j
in such a way that λ1jγ1 is neither zero nor equal to −
∑n
i=1 λ
1
i + λ
1
j . Note that in the binary case, q = 2, we need
to enlarge the field to some F2s1 .
3. Define the matrix H1 obtained from H by replacing the vector h j by h j. Observe that H1 defines the same linear
dependence relations as H, since linear dependence behaves well when extending scalars to a field extension,
and therefore both matrices realize the same access structure.
At the end of this process we have found a linear combination based on A1 over Fqs1 such that∑n
j=1 λ
1
jh1j = 0 and
∑n
j=1 λ
1
j , 0,
where h1j denotes the j-th column of the matrix H1 for j = 1, . . . , n.
Once we have modified the original code and probably the field of definition for the set A1 we check A2. If all
linear combination based on A2 over Fqs1 satisfy the following expression:∑
j=1 λ jh1j = 0 with
∑n
j=1 λ j = 0 .
Then we proceed as follows (otherwise we skip this step):
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1. Choose an arbitrary linear combination of the above set, say λ21, . . . , λ2n where
λ2j , 0 if P j ∈ A2,
∑n
j=1 λ
2
jh
1
j = 0 and
∑n
j=1 λ
2
j = 0.
2. Take a column h1j such that λ
2
j , 0 and define the vector
h1j =
1
γ2
h1j
in such a way that:
(a) If P j < A1 then λ2jγ2 is neither zero nor equal to −
∑n
i=1 λ
2
i + λ j.
(b) Otherwise λ2jγ2 has to be different from zero and from the values
−
∑n
i=1 λ
1
i + λ
1
j and −
∑n
i=1 λ
2
i + λ
2
j .
3. Define the matrix H2 obtained from H1 by replacing the column h1j by h1j . Again H
2 realize the same access
structure as H1 and H.
Similarly to the previous process, we obtain a linear combination based on A2 over Fqs2 such that
∑n
j=1 λ
2
jh
2
j = 0 and
∑n
j=1 λ
2
j , 0 .
Let us now proceed by induction. Suppose that we have a parity check matrix Hl whose code (possibly defined in
an extension of the scalars) realizes the structure ΓC and for each Ai with i ≤ l there exists a linear combination of the
corresponding rows to the supports of Ai with the sum of the coefficients different from zero. Suppose that for each
linear combination based on Al+1 over Fqsl we have
∑n
j=1 λ jhlj = 0 with
∑n
j=1 λ j = 0.
Then we choose an arbitrary linear combination of the above set, say λl+11 , . . . , λ
l+1
n , we take a column hlj of H
l
corresponding to the support of Al+1 such that λl+1j , 0 and we define
hlj =
1
γl+1
hlj
where γl+1 satisfy the following properties:
• If P j < {A1, . . . , Al} then λl+1j · γ
l+1
<
{
0,−∑ni=1 λl+1i + λl+1j }.
• If P j is only in At and Al+1 with t = 1, . . . , l then
λl+1j · γ
l+1
<
0,−
n∑
i=1
λl+1i + λ
l+1
j ,−
n∑
i=1
λti + λ
t
j
 .
• . . .
• If P j is in Ai1 , . . . , Ais and Al+1 then
λl+1j · γ
l+1
<
0,−
n∑
i=1
λl+1i + λ
l+1
j ,−
n∑
i=1
λ
i1
i + λ
i1
j , . . . ,−
n∑
i=1
λ
is
i + λ
is
j
 .
• . . .
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• If P j is in A1, . . . , Al, Al+1 then
λl+1j · γ
l+1
<
0,−
n∑
i=1
λl+1i + λ
l+1
j ,−
n∑
i=1
λ1i + λ
1
j , . . . ,−
n∑
i=1
λli + λ
l
j
 .
The steps above could require to enlarge the field in order to get enough coefficients. We define Hl+1 to be the
matrix obtained by replacing hlj by hlj in Hl. Hl+1 defines the same linear dependence relations as Hl, . . . , H1 and H.
Thus the induction step is proved and we can conclude the proof, i.e. in at most α steps we get a parity check matrix
Hα defining a code with the required properties.
Theorem 1. If Γ0 admits a vector space construction then also Γ0[C1, . . . ,Cs] admits a vector space construction.
Proof. Consider the map Φ0 : {Pi}ri=1 → Fdq that endows Γ0 with a vector space construction. For each linear code
Ci we consider the code C′i that has as parity check matrix the matrix Hi constructed in the proof of Lemma 1,
probably defined in some field extension of Fq. We denote by hij the j-th column of Hi. Now we consider the map
Φ : P −→ F
d+∑si=1 ni
qs defined by
Φ(Pij) = (Φ0(Pi), 0n1 , . . . , 0n j−1 , (hij)t︸︷︷︸
j+1-th position
, 0n j+1 , . . . , 0ns),
where 0l denotes the zero vector of length l. We shall prove that Φ endows Γ = Γ0[C′1, . . . ,C′s] with a vector space
construction, and therefore also Γ0[C1, . . . ,Cs] has a vector space construction since they define the same access
structure by Lemma 1. Let A ∈ Γ be a qualified set and B = {Pi | Pi ∩ A ∈ Γi} ∈ Γ0. Let Ai = {Pij1 , . . . , P
i
jli } , ∅
be the set A ∩ Pi and suppose that it is a minimal qualified set (otherwise it always contains one). Thus the vectors
{hij1 , . . . , h
i
jli } are linearly dependent and all subsets of them of cardinality li − 1 are linearly independent. By Lemma
1 we have that there exist a codeword in C′i given by (0, . . . , 0, λij1 , 0, . . . , 0, λijli , 0, . . . , 0) such that 0 =
∑li
k=1 λ
i
jk h
i
jk and∑li
k=1 λ
i
jk , 0. Thus for each Pi ∈ B the following non-zero vector
0 ,
li∑
k=1
λijkΦ(Pijk) =

li∑
k=1
λijkΦ0(Pi), 0, . . . , 0

belongs to 〈Φ(A)〉, and since Φ0 defines a vector space structure on Γ0 then
e1 ∈
〈 li∑
k=1
λijkΦ0(Pi)
〉
Pi∈B
and we have that (e1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ 〈Φ(A)〉.
On the other hand, let now A ⊆ P be a participant set such that e1 ∈ 〈Φ(A)〉. Then e1 ∈ 〈Φ0(B)〉 and for each Pi ∈ B
if Ai = A∩Pi then 0 ∈ 〈πi(Φ(B))〉where πi is the restriction of Φ(B) to the interval
[
d + 1 +∑i−1j=1 n j, d +∑ij=1 n j ].
Therefore there exists a codeword in C′i with support corresponding to the participants of the set Ai = A ∩ Pi for each
Pi ∈ B.
Corollary 1. ΓC admits a vector space construction.
Proof. Note that ΓC = (1, 1)[C] so we can apply the above theorem.
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